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The dissertation discusses as a research object the conflicts of interest relating to 
credit ratings and centres upon a U.S. law perspective. The paper provides an analysis 
of various regulations, including the market discipline, the judicial regulation and the 
administrative regulation. Based on the above the paper sets out suggestions for 
establishment and perfection of regulation systems on the conflicts of interest 
regarding credit ratings in China. 
In Chapter One the author presents an overview of the basic theories. This 
chapter first analyses the definition, contents and the sources of conflicts of interest 
relating to credit ratings,the possible adverse effects resulting from conflicts of 
interest and the important implications of regulation on the conflicts of interest. Then 
this chapter explores that various methods of regulation on conflicts of interest 
including the market discipline, the judicial regulation and the administrative 
regulation. 
In Chapter Two the author discusses the market discipline on the conflicts of 
interest relating to credit ratings. The reputation mechanisms are the force of 
self-regulation of credit rating agencies. Under the reputation mechanisms, credit 
rating agencies adopt the greatwall, rating procedures and the internal code of 
conducts to control the conflict of interest. Reputation mechanisms played the 
important role in the early stage of the development of credit rating industry. In the 
late twentieth century, with the emergence of monopoly in credit rating industry, 
expansion of power of regulatory license and the deficiency in the reputation 
mechanisms, the  limitation of the market discipline has already been exposed, and 
the regulation targeting the reputation mechanisms is ineffective. 
In Chapter Three the author discusses the judicial regulation on the conflicts of 
interest relating to credit ratings. The conflicts give rise to inaccurate ratings, and the 
plaintiff would accuse credit rating agencies of libel, fraud or negligent representation. 
Subchapter One analyses the judicial regulation on libel and draws the conclusion that 
the credit rating agencies’ issuance of negative unsolicited ratings were entitled to 
First Amendment protection and the libel litigation may not function as deterrence to 
dishonest unsolicited ratings. Subchapter Two analysis the judicial regulation on fraud 














fraud in ratings under the common law and securities law. Subchapter three analyses 
the judicial regulation on the negligent representation. Due to the consideration of 
interest of the industry and judicial administration, rating agencies owe the negligent 
liability to limited scope of public investor under the common law. Credit rating 
agencies will assume the negligent representation liability of inaccurate ratings under 
the securities law if they were willing to consent to inclusion of their ratings in 
registration statements or prospectuses. So the judicial regulation performs a limited 
function as deterrence to dishonest ratings under the common law and securities law. 
There has been no relevant criminal cases reported in U.S. up to now, therefore the 
paper focuses on the civil liability relating to credit rating agencies. 
In Chapter Four the author discusses the administrative regulation on the conflict 
of interest relating to credit rating. Subchapter One analysis the basic system of the 
administrative regulation and explains that the administrative is at the core status in 
the structure of regulation on conflicts of interest and the paths of the administrative 
regulation include the regulation on internal control system, the regulation on 
information disclosure system and the prohibition of activities creating conflicts. 
Subchapter Two discusses the regulation targeting structural conflicts of interest at the 
rating agency level. Subchapter Three discusses the regulation targeting activity-based 
conflict of interest at the rating agency level. Subchapter Four discusses the 
regulations targeting conflicts of interest at the analyst level. Subchapter Five 
proposes the perfection measures of rating quality regulation after discussing the 
deficiency of the current administrative regulation. 
In Chapter Five the author discusses the current regulation on conflicts of interest 
relating to credit ratings in China and its perfection. Subchapter One analysis the 
status quo of market discipline on conflicts of interest relating to credit ratings in 
China and proposes its perfection. Subchapter Two discusses the judicial regulation on 
the conflicts of interest in China and proposes its perfection. Subchapter Three puts 
forward the proposed rules to control the conflicts of interest including establishing 
internal control system, information disclosure system and rating quality regulation. 
In addition, the paper proposes that the government shall designate a supervisory body 
and develop the competitive credit rating industry. 
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CDO Collateralized Debt Obligation 
COSO Committee of Sponsoring Organization of the Treadway Commission 
Fitch Fitch, Inc. 
HHI Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions 
Moody's Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. 
NRSRO Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization 
RMBS Residential Mortgage-backed Securities 
SEC U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
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